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Abstract
In official terms, European countries that are not in the EMU have 
been showing a polarization of monetary policy regimes in the last 
fifteen years:  either Inflation Targeting or fixed exchange rates. I 
apply  several  methods  recently  developed  by  the  literature  to 
measure  exchange rate flexibility  to these European countries,  in 
order to see whether such polarization has indeed occurred from a 
de facto point of view. Using these approaches, I find that the move 
to  Inflation  Targeting  did  bring  about  higher  exchange  rate 
flexibility, but only up to a level that is not comparable to that of the 
non-European  benchmark  floaters.  Inflation  Targeters  in  Europe 
also seem to have put some weight on stabilization of the exchange 
rate vis à vis the euro, after its introduction; fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, instead, apart from official policy changes, remained 
mostly stable throughout the last decade.
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1. Introduction
This paper applies several techniques recently developed by the literature on exchange rate 
regimes classification to European countries that did not enter the EMU. Since the 1990s, a 
gradual polarization of exchange rate regimes (either flexible rates, coupled with Inflation 
Targeting,  or  strict  pegs)  characterized  the  whole  international  monetary  system,  with 
“intermediate” regimes gradually disappearing. Previous works (for example, Frankel [1999] 
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2005]) showed that, however, from a  de facto point of 
view, the majority of countries still lies in the shaded area between these two extremes. A 
similar de jure pattern characterized official exchange rate policies also in Europe, after the 
collapse  of  the  the  Communist  Bloc  at  the  end of  the  1980s  and of  the  ERM in 1992. 
Countries that did not enter the EMU in the first wave either moved to Inflation Targeting or 
to a fixed exchange rate with the euro. In particular,  several  smaller  countries joined the 
currency union (Slovenia,  Cyprus,  Malta  and Slovakia).  The objective of this  work is  to 
assess to what extent such a polarization, in Europe, also occurred  de facto; in particular, 
whether the exchange rate policies of non-euro countries changed after the introduction of 
the euro and also whether there is evidence of “Fear of Floating” –  in the terminology of 
Calvo and Reinhart [2002] – episodes in Europe. In other words, I want to assess whether, on 
the one hand, countries that officially are Inflation Targeting also pursued separate exchange 
rate objectives, while on the other hand countries that declared a peg to the euro did indeed 
keep the exchange rate fixed towards the official  reference currency.  The novelty of this 
paper is, first of all, in its focus on Europe, trying to draw a line between the pre-euro and the 
euro  era.  Second,  rather  than  introducing  a  new  classification  scheme,  I  use  different 
approaches, combining the “de jure vs. de facto flexibility” classification scheme of Calvo 
and Reinhart [2002] with the approach to estimate currency weights in baskets of Frankel and 
Wei  [2008],  in  order  to  understand  whether  these  two  approaches  lead  to  consistent 
conclusions. 
I  use  regime  classification  methods,  rather  than  estimating  the  monetary  policy  reaction 
function, because the latter approach does not take into account exchange rate objectives in 
monetary policy when the latter are pursued with instruments different from the setting of the 
policy interest rate, as discussed in Section 2: actually, as Taylor [2001] and Edwards [2006], 
point out, if Inflation Targeting central banks took exchange rate movements under control in 
setting  the  interest  rate,  this  would  require  a  high  variability  of  the  latter,  which  is  not 
observed in  practice:  this,  however,  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  they  use  other 
instruments like foreign exchange reserves; therefore, I do not focus on interest rate setting.
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As it  is  well  known, 16 out of 27 European Union Member States have now joined the 
Monetary Union (EMU). In official terms, the exchange rate regimes of non-euro countries 
range from a currency board – actually a fixed parity – in Estonia and Lithuania to freely 
floating rates in Western and Central European countries that adopted Inflation Targeting. 
The results of the paper are quite surprising: while fixed exchange rate arrangements vis à vis 
the euro remained fairly stable and consistent with official policy statements throughout the 
last decade, Inflation Targeting regimes appear to have brought about higher exchange rate 
flexibility, but not to a level comparable to that of non-European countries. In particular, I 
find evidence that they have put some weight on euro exchange rate stabilization. Van Dijk et 
al. [2006] have shown, using dynamic conditional correlations, that the correlation between 
the US Dollar exchange rate of the main European non-euro currencies, namely the Swedish 
Krona, the Swiss Franc, the U.K. Pound and the Norwegian Krone and the euro has increased 
both after the launch of the euro at the end of 1996 and its formal introduction in 1999. 
Following this result, the authors state that “non-euro countries may wish to gain maximum 
positive spill-over effects by keeping their currencies more in line with the euro”1, so that the 
benefits of lower exchange rate variability are achieved without the drawbacks of joining the 
Monetary  Union  (namely  the  loss  of  monetary  policy  independence).  In  the  case  of 
Switzerland, Reynard [2008] has pointed out the stabilization role of the euro, which has 
reduced the fluctuations of the Swiss Franc against the U.S. Dollar. The results of the present 
paper confirm those findings and suggest that, since its introduction, the euro has gradually 
become an informal anchor for most European currencies.
The paper is structured as follows: the issue of the role of the exchange rate in monetary 
policy rules is introduced in Section 2, using a very simple and stylized model; Section 3 
reviews the main approaches to exchange rate regime classification that have been developed 
in the literature with a focus on those which will be applied in this work; in Section 4 the data 
are presented. The results are shown in Sections 5-6. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  The role  of  the  exchange rate  in  monetary  policy  rules  and the  case  for  limited 
flexibility.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes are 
still widely discussed. On one hand, under a peg, the lack of exchange rate adjustments can 
result in price distortions and misallocation of resources; the need to defend a peg in case of 
1 Van Dijk et al., p. 20.
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speculative attacks can result in costly real interest rate spikes (see Calvo [1999]); there is 
some evidence as well that output volatility is  higher and output growth tends to be lower 
(Levy-Yeyati  and  Sturzenegger  [2003])2.  On  the  other  hand,  by  reducing  relative  price 
volatility,  a peg is  likely to  stimulate  investment  and trade,  and this  can have a positive 
impact on growth. 
For small open economies, since the 1990s the move towards flexible exchange rates was 
coupled with the adoption of different forms of Inflation Targeting (in U.K., Sweden, Chile, 
New Zealand, Israel, to name but a few). When we consider inflation targeting – and indeed 
the majority of the countries in the sample that will be introduced in Section 4 is Inflation 
Targeting –, due to the pass-through effect of the exchange rate on prices, one might ask 
whether the Central Bank should control exchange rate movements directly. More precisely, 
a Central Bank should keep an eye on exchange rate developments if it has the objective of 
keeping inflation low and stabilize output, because exchange rate movements have an impact 
on the price of  imported  goods and on aggregate  output.  Svensson ([2000] and [1999]), 
showed within a small open economy model that flexible CPI inflation targeting can in fact 
reduce  the  volatility  of  output  and  the  real  exchange  rate  while  keeping  inflation  under 
control,  a  result  that  is  shared  with  Gali  and  Monacelli  [2005].  Svensson  [2003]  also 
acknowledges that it is possible for central banks to engage in exchange rate smoothing, i.e. 
to use the monetary policy instrument in order to limit the volatility of the exchange rate or 
stabilize the real exchange rate to some “potential level”. In his model, this would mean that 
deviations  of  the  exchange  rate  from target  are  in  the  loss  function  of  the  central  bank 
together with inflation deviation from target and the output gap. However, he also suggests 
that  there  should be no reason for  central  banks  in  advanced countries  to  have separate 
exchange-rate  and  inflation  objectives  in  setting  their  monetary  policy.  Exchange  rate 
smoothing resulting from IT would therefore only be implicit and depending on the degree of 
exchange  rate  pass-through  and  the  share  of  imported  final  goods.  These  results  are  in 
agreement  with Clarida [2001], who states that  “in practice, a monetary policy aimed at  
achieving only domestic objectives may also serve to stabilize the exchange rate,  […] and 
thus  be  difficult  to  distinguish  from a  policy  of  maintaining  the  exchange rate  within  a  
band”3.
We  can  use  a  very  simple  and  stylized  model,  with  no  dynamics,  to  describe  different 
attitudes of monetary policy towards exchange rate variability. This model and the following 
2 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger actually find evidence of significantly lower GDP growth in the case of pegs 
for developing countries, but the same result does not hold for industrial countries.
3 Clarida [2001], p 15.
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discussion applies, in particular, to advanced economies and, in general, countries that are 
not subject to extreme output,  inflation and interest  rates variability,  as it  is  the case for 
Europe4.
Assume that  the evolution  of the domestic  output  gap,  x,  is  described by the Aggregate 
Demand curve:
  x=x x
F−r r−r q q (1)
where the domestic output gap depends on net foreign demand for domestic goods (which, in 
turn, would depend on the foreign business cycle), the gap between the real interest rate and 
the target rate, and the change in the real effective exchange rate;  ϑ is an “excess demand” 
shock as in Svensson [2003].
CPI inflation, by definition, depends on domestic inflation and imported inflation:
  c=Fq1− (2)
where  ξ is the share of imported goods in the CPI,  δ is the degree of exchange rate pass-
through and π is domestic inflation. Domestic inflation depends on the output gap5:
  =x x  (3)
where  ν is a “cost-push shock” as in Svensson [2000, 2003]. Both  ν and  ϑ are zero-mean 
with variance respectively equal to σ2 ν and σ2ϑ .
The evolution of CPI inflation can thus be described by an Aggregate Supply curve like:
  c=x x
Fq (4)
where βx = ϕx ∙ ξ and η =  ν∙ξ .
Monetary policy is described by a Forward-Looking Taylor Rule6:
  i=r E [ c−∣]x E  x∣ qq (5)
i.e. the level of the policy rate set by the central bank depends on the target real interest rate, 
the inflation target (the sum of the two can be interpreted as the “target nominal interest 
rate”) and is higher when inflation is above target and / or there is a positive output gap, or 
when the effective exchange rate weakens (q increases).
By simply projecting the AS and AD curves, which form the Central Bank's information set, 
in (5), the following result is obtained:
4 This point might become clearer below, where I introduce the correlation between the domestic policy rate and 
the target country policy rate as one of the relevant priors for exchange rate regime classification. In practice, it 
could not be applied to de facto “freely falling” regimes and “hyperfloats”, as identified by Reinhart and Rogoff 
[2004].
5 In a more complete framework, domestic inflation is also affected by past inflation, future expected inflation 
and the real exchange rate since it affects the price of imported intermediate goods.
6 The rule (5) is as general as possible in this simple framework, since we have not said anything specific on the 
monetary policy rule followed by the central bank. Below we will insert the necessary restrictions.
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  i=r[1−Fq− ] x [ x xF−r r−r q q]q q  (6)
Given this  very general  rule,  we can see that  a  central  bank can  react  to  exchange rate 
changes directly, via the last term in (6), and indirectly, since the exchange rate affects CPI 
inflation  via  imported  inflation  and  the  output  gap  via  resource  utilization.  In  order  to 
maintain price determinacy it must also be that γπ > 0 (see Woodford [2003]). Notice that 
Inflation Targeting should focus on the real exchange rate, while managed floats, pegs and 
limited flexibility regimes focus on a target level of nominal7 exchange rate. From this point 
of view, we can see why a policy in an IT country aimed directly at stabilizing the nominal 
exchange rate would be evidence of fear of floating.
In particular, we can use (6) to write the policy rules of central banks following different 
monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy  strategies.  Following the  IMF classification,  we can 
identify four broad classes of exchange rate arrangements: Floating, Fixed, Managed Float 
and  Limited  Flexibility,  where  “Limited  Flexibility”  was  used,  in  general,  for  European 
countries with exchange rate arrangements with each other like the ERM. For a country that 
is in a Fixed, Managed Float or Limited Flexibility regime, the rule becomes:
  i=iee 8 (7)
e is the nominal exchange rate vis à vis the reference currency and γe > 0. The policy rate is 
thus  equal  to  the target  nominal  interest  rate,  and tends  to  be higher  when the currency 
weakens and lower otherwise. This policy is clearly described, for example, in the Danmarks 
Nationalbank's “Introduction to Monetary and Fixed Exchange Rate Policy”. Denmark has a 
fixed exchange rate vis à vis the euro area, and the DNB states that “ […] when the foreign-
exchange market is calm, the fixed-exchange-rate policy means that Danmarks Nationalbank 
adjusts its interest rates in step with the ECB's adjustments. In a situation with upward or 
downward  pressure  on  the  krone  or  a  sustained  inflow  or  outflow of  foreign  currency, 
Danmarks Nationalbank unilaterally changes its interest rates in order to stabilise the krone.” 
The monetary policy regime that is most common in non-euro Europe is Inflation Targeting. 
All IT Central Banks follow flexible forms of Inflation Targeting, where some weight in the 
policy function is attached to output stabilization as well. Ball and Reyes [2008] choose to 
ignore flexible inflation targeting, stating that they treat IT in their study “[...] to mean strict  
and honest  IT. [...] Interest  rate  interventions  for exchange rate reasons associated with  
output concerns but not inflation target concerns would be empirical evidence of Fear of  
7 Not necessarily bilateral: in the case of a basket peg, the focus is on a weighted exchange rate.
8 By UIP reasoning, the target level of the nominal interest rate is equal to the reference country's target plus a 
risk premium.
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Floating”.9 This is an overly restrictive hypothesis even for a very stylized model, since it has 
been acknowledged (Svensson [2000], Gali and Monacelli [2005]) that strict CPI Inflation 
Targeting results in higher output variability, which can be hardly socially acceptable, with 
respect to flexible IT, and IT Central Banks generally have output stabilization among their 
declared objectives (for example, in Sweden, the U.K., Australia, just to name a few).
Equation (6)  for a country that engages in “honest” flexible CPI inflation targeting has γs = 
0, and therefore becomes:
i=r[1−Fq− ]x [ x xF−r r−r  q q] (8)
From the above rule we can see that indeed a honest inflation targeter might react indirectly 
to  exchange  rate  changes;  in  particular,  the  change  in  the  interest  rate  following  a 
depreciation in the (trade-weighted) currency is:
∂ i IT
∂ q
=xq0 (9)
The  responsiveness  of  the  policy  interest  rate  to  (nominal  effective)  exchange  rate 
movements depends on the weight on inflation in the policy rule, γπ , the level of openness as 
described by ξ, the degree of exchange rate pass-through to inflation, δ, and the impact of the 
exchange rate changes on output.
In this framework, I define an IT country of the “Fear of Floating” type, using Calvo and 
Reinhart's [2002] terminology, as one that is pursuing exchange rate objectives separate from 
its official policy targets, as in Ball and Reyes [2008], with  γq > 0 and therefore
∂ iFF
∂ q
=xqq
∂ i IT
∂q
(10)
Interest rates variability is therefore higher than in honest IT; it must be noted, however, that 
one other element characterizes FF episodes: if the (implicit) target value of the currency is 
defined in nominal terms of one reference currency rather than a basket or a trade-weighted 
index, then the bilateral exchange rate should enter the policy function, and the central banks 
would react to changes in the bilateral exchange rate, which makes the policy more similar to 
that of an exchange rate targeter.  
For a strict floater, monetary policy can be described here by a standard forward-looking 
Taylor Rule with weight placed on domestic inflation, as measured by the GDP price deflator 
as in the original Taylor Rule, and therefore (6) becomes:
i=r [− ]x [x xF−r r−r q q] (11)
9 Ball, Reyes [2008], p. 313.
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and  thus,  even  in  the  case  of  the  most  committed  floaters,  the  interest  rate  responds  to 
changes in the exchange rate, because of its role in influencing the output gap:
∂ iF
∂ q
= xq
∂ i IT
∂ q
 (12)
Foreign exchange intervention to defend the exchange rate, however, need not come only 
through the policy interest rate channel. Central Banks use foreign exchange reserves, as well 
as other “hidden” channels like credit lines to maintain the desired value of the currency with 
respect  to one or more reference currencies.  In theory,  foreign exchange reserves should 
never change in case of committed floaters, and variability should be higher the less flexible 
the  exchange  rate  and  in  particular  in  situations  of  financial  turbulence  (for  example, 
speculative  attacks).  In  reality,  this  is  not  the  case:  reserves  change  even  for  the  most 
committed  floaters,  and  also for  reasons  other  than exchange rate  stabilization10.  Indeed, 
Taylor  [2001]  and  Edwards  [2006]  claim  that  if  the  Central  Bank  took  exchange  rate 
movements  into account  in setting the policy interest  rate,  this  would result  in excessive 
interest variability, which is not observed in practice. 
If a Central Bank is actually pursuing an IT strategy but also has a separate exchange rate 
smoothing  objective,  therefore,  it  is  likely  to  use  instruments  different  from  the  policy 
interest rate to that end. 
Considering a simple model of exchange rate determination, the reason is clear. The value of 
a currency depends, as for any asset, on supply and demand of the currency itself. The level 
of  interest  rates  will  influence  demand  through  international  financial  inflows/outflows. 
Central Banks can, however, use foreign exchange reserves to affect supply and demand of 
the  domestic  currency.  Consider  a  very  simple,  undergaduate-course-flavoured  monetary 
approach  model  of  exchange  rate  determination  where  you  only  have  two  countries,  a 
domestic (h) and a foreign (f) country. 
Total demand for real-money holdings in each country is determined by the private sector 
demand.  Private  sector  demand  is  determined  by:  i)  transaction  purposes,  where,  for 
simplicity,  only home country goods are demanded; ii) investment / speculative purposes, 
depending on the level of domestic interest rates, while uncovered interest parity is supposed 
to hold:  
M D
P
=k Y h
a ebi
10 See Section 5 below for a discussion on the role of foreign exchange reserves as a measure of commitment 
towards flexible exchange rates.
8
Table 1. Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes according to theoretical priors
σ2e σ2R σ2i corr(i,i*) corr(r,π) corr(r, e)
Fixed Nil / Low High High High Low High
Managed Float / 
Limited Flexibility
Low High High High Low High
Fear of Floating Low High High Interm. Interm.
Inflation Targeting Interm. Low Low Low High Low
Float High Low Low Low High Low
σ2e = variance of the (bilateral of effective) exchange rate; σ2R = variance of reserves; σ2i = variance 
of the policy rate; i* = foreign (reference country) policy rate; e = bilateral or effective ER.
Assuming purchasing power parity holds, and thus Pf = S Pd , and taking logs, we can define 
the exchange rate as clearing the differences in relative demand and supply of domestic and 
foreign currency:
s=a  y f − yh [ ln k f −lnk h]b i f−i h m f −mh (13)
Equation (13) states the well-known result of the monetary approach, that the level of the 
exchange rate tends to fall (the currency appreciates) when domestic interest rates are higher 
than foreign rates, when there is an expansion in domestic monetary base relative to foreign 
monetary base, and it also depends on relative output and money velocity.
If a central  bank is targeting the exchange rate,  when it  sees an undesired change in the 
exchange rate  (for example,  an increase),  it  can either  change the interest  rate to a level 
higher  than  the  target  country's,  or  reduce  the  monetary  base  by  increasing  its  foreign 
exchange reserves. By using monetary instruments, the Central Bank can manage, at least in 
the short run, to keep the exchange rate stable while maintaining an independent interest rate 
policy.
The model outlined in this section, albeit very stylized, allows us to order monetary policy 
regimes according to some priors, similar to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2005], Calvo 
and Reinhart [2002] and Ball and Reyes [2008]. Out of these priors, we will focus on those 
related  to  the  exchange rate  and reserves.  Table  1  summarizes  these  conclusions,  where 
“high”, “low” and “intermediate” are in relative terms.
3. Review of the Literature on Exchange Rates Regimes Classification
It has been discussed in the literature why a central bank would pursue an exchange rate 
policy that is different from what is officially declared. One reason is that an exchange rate 
band or a peg is prone to speculative attacks when the markets perceive that the commitment 
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of the central bank to maintain the parity is no longer credible; in order to defend the peg, the 
Central Bank may thus be forced to engage in costly interest rate spikes. 
Such speculative attacks can occur even when there is no credibility problem on the Central 
Bank's side, making the prophecy of the abandonment of the parity self-fulfilling.   
In recent years, there has been a growing empirical literature, on which the present paper 
draws, aimed at estimating the degree of exchange rate flexibility, and thus distinguishing de 
facto exchange rate regimes from de jure regimes. Indeed, many countries that announce the 
intention to float actually informally manage the exchange rate in order to avoid excessive 
volatility:  research on exchange rate  flexibility  is  based on the idea  that,  rather  than the 
official label of the regime, what countries do can be better described by movements in asset 
prices and foreign exchange reserves. 
To be precise, exchange rate regimes can be classified according to a  de jure   or  de facto 
scheme:  the former  says  what countries  claim that  they are  doing,  the latter  is  based on 
empirical analysis of the behaviour of exchange rates, reserves, money supply and so on.
According to the IMF classification,  there are four exchange rate arrangements:  Floating, 
Fixed,  Managed Float  and Limited  Flexibility.  Until  1997,  the IMF’s  Annual  Report  on 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions was completed asking each country 
to  self-report  their  exchange  rate  regime:  this  is  the  de jure classification  scheme.  Such 
classification method was upgraded in 1997 and the Report now follows a new approach that 
is closer to the de facto classification schemes presented below. 
Table 2 presents the de jure classification of current exchange rate arrangements in Europe, 
where we also include Inflation Targeting as a separate regime.
Reinhart and Rogoff [2004] reclassified exchange rate arrangements for 153 countries from 
the end of World War II to 2001, finding that in the large majority of the cases the de facto, 
exchange rate  regime was different  from the  de jure regime.  All  of the countries  in our 
sample were also in Reinhart and Rogoff's. In particular, they use use monthly observations 
of the absolute percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate vis à vis a reference currency 
calculating the probability that  the exchange rate remains within a one, two or 5 percent 
band. A country is classified as a peg if it is officially pegging and a dominant reference 
currency  can  be  identified. If  inflation  is  larger  than  40%,  we  have  “freely  falling”  or 
“hyperfloat” cases. When inflation is lower than 40%, the de facto classification depends on 
the probability that the absolute percent change in  market exchange rates (e) remains within 
some pre-specified band over a rolling 5-year (or 2-year) period. 
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Table 2. De jure exchange rate regimes in Europe
Floating EMU Inflation Targeting Hungary
United Kingdom
Czech Republic
Poland
Sweden
Romania
Iceland
Norway
Switzerland
Limited Flexibility Denmark
Lithuania
Latvia
Peg Estonia
Bulgaria
Managed Floating Russia
Being ε the absolute percentage  change in the exchange rate, if P( ε < 1%) is 80% or larger, 
the regime is classified as a de facto peg, crawling peg or moving peg. If P( ε < 2%) is 80% 
or larger (the threshold is 5% if the official band is larger), the regime is classified as a de 
facto  narrow,  narrow crawling or  narrow moving band.  In order to distinguish between 
managed float and freely floating, they calculate the degree of exchange rate flexibility as  e / 
P( ε < 1%). If, for some country, the estimated ratio falls in the 99% confidence interval of 
the “committed floaters' group”, then the country is classified as freely floating. Managed 
Floating cases are therefore residual episodes.
The classification scheme set up by Reinhart and Rogoff is thus much richer than the original 
IMF de jure classification, and is more appropriate if one wants to study the real merits of 
exchange rate policies.  
The view that  the world is  moving towards a polarization of exchange rate regimes (i.e. 
either strict pegs/currency unions or freely floating) has been proved to be not correct, among 
others, by Calvo and Reinhart [2002] and Ball and Reyes [2008]. Many countries actually lie 
in between; the fact that countries put in place an exchange rate policy that is different from 
what  they  officially  claim  has  been  labeled  “Fear  of  Floating”  by  Calvo  and  Reinhart 
(henceforth CR); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger [2007], however, proved that in most of the 
cases it  is a fear of  appreciation.  The motivation of such exchange rate  management  in 
disguise would be the view of a depreciated exchange rate  as a means of protection  for 
domestic industries.
CR  use  priors  and  a  classification  scheme  which  are  quite  dirrerent  from Reinhart  and 
Rogoff's. As they argue, from an official point of view, there are four types of exchange rate 
regimes:  peg,  limited  flexibility,  managed floating and freely floating.  Limited flexibility 
includes exchange rate arrangements in Europe during the ERM era, while a peg is a stricter 
commitment towards fixed rates. In reality, the regimes can be collapsed to pegs, floats and 
“fear  of  floating”  (FF).  Ball  and  Reyes  [2008]  (henceforth  BR)  include  also  Inflation 
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Targeting (IT) as a regime which is different both from free float and a peg but closer to the 
former, arguing that IT regimes can determine, as a side effect, a reduction in the volatility of 
the exchange rate, as we have also seen in Section 2, but should be identified separately from 
the  others.  The  pattern  of  asset  prices,  reserves  and  inflation  in  different  exchange  rate 
regimes is described,  by CR and BR, using several  theoretical  priors. Merging the priors 
presented by CR and BR, taking a threshold x for the monthly change in a particular variable, 
then the following priors should hold:
− lower exchange rate variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs with respect to 
free floats and inflation targeting:
  P e x∣Peg ,FF P ex∣Float , IT  (14)
− higher reserve variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs with respect to free 
floats and inflation targeting:
  P Fx∣Peg , FF P F x∣Float , IT  (15)
− higher inflation variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs with respect to free 
floats and inflation targeting:
  P x∣Peg , FF P x∣Float , IT  (16)
− higher correlation (in absolute value) between inflation and the real interest rate than 
between rean interest rate and exchange rate in inflation targeting regimes:
  
  corr  ,r∣IT ∣corr r ,e∣IT ∣ (17)
− higher real interest rates variability in fear of floating episodes and pegs with respect 
to free floats and inflation targeting:
  P rx∣Peg , FF P  r x∣Float , IT  (18)
What (14) says is that the probability that the monthly percentage change (in absolute value) 
in the exchange rate is lower than some threshold (for example, 2.5% in CR) in case of a peg 
or fear of floating is lower than the probability that  the change in the exchange rate lies 
within such narrow bands in the case of a floating regime or IT. In other words, exchange 
rate  variability  is  higher  in  various  kinds  of  floating  regimes  than  in  de  facto  pegs  and 
managed floats.
Inequality (15) states that the probability that the monthly percentage change (in absolute 
value) in the foreign exchange reserves is lower than some threshold (for example 2.5%) in 
case of a peg or fear of floating is higher than the probability that the change in the foreign 
exchange reserves lies within such narrow bands in the case of a floating regime. The reason 
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is that if a country is trying to manage the exchange rate in order to reduce its volatility using 
foreign reserves, then we should observe a high volatility in the latter. 
Inequality (16) states that inflation variability is higher in pegs, fear of floating and managed 
floats  in  general  than it  is  in IT and floats.  This prior,  as  the above,  is  in line with the 
predictions  of  Svensson  [2000]  and  Gali  and  Monacelli  [2005]  that  were  cited  above 
regarding flexible inflation targeting as opposed to a strict peg.  
Prior (17) states that, in IT, (the absolute value of) the correlation between the inflation rate 
and changes in the real interest rate11 should be higher than the correlation between changes 
in the the real interest rate and in the exchange rate, while the opposite should hold for fixed. 
Since the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, the Central Bank is expected to raise 
it  when  inflation  is  above  target  in  order  to  reduce  the  inflationary  pressure;  the 
responsiveness to movements in the inflation rate should be higher than that to movements in 
the exchange rate. On the other hand, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank uses 
the interest rate to stabilize the exchange rate, and the correlation between changes in real 
interest  rates  and  in  the  exchange  rate  should  be  higher,  in  absolute  terms,  than  the 
correlation between the inflation rate and changes in  r.  Finally,  prior (18) states that  real 
interest rates are more volatile in pegs and managed floats than they are in IT and free floats. 
Both CR and BR also use a prior similar to (13) and (14) for the interest rate, using a 4% 
(400 basis points) threshold. Such prior, in the present analysis, would not be informative 
since interest rate variability is much lower than that in the CR sample, and it will therefore 
not be employed in section 512.
As discussed by CR, the use of these priors in place of descriptive statistics such as mean 
absolute deviation, since the the former avoid the problem of outliers, which give excessive 
weight to observations corresponding to large devaluations13. 
Descriptive statistics are, however, used by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger ([2003], [2005] 
and [2007]): the classification criteria they employed are in fact based on three variables: 
“exchange rate volatility”, measured as the average of absolute monthly percentage change in 
the nominal exchange rate relative to the relevant anchor currency; “volatility of exchange 
rate  changes”,  measured  as the  standard deviation  of monthly percentage  changes  in the 
11 The real interest rate is calculated as: ( ) 


−+×=
+
11100
1t
t
tt P
P
ir where P is the consumer price index.
12 The only occasion when the change in the interest rate was higher than 4% within a month was in september/
october 1992, during the speculative attacks that led to the collapse of the ERM.
13 Calvo, Reinhart (2002), p. 384. 
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exchange rate; “volatility of reserves”, that is the average of the absolute monthly change in 
dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves relative to the monetary base.
The strand of literature that has been discussed so far is aimed at estimating the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility when we know the relevant – or possible – anchor currency for the 
country that is being studied. The limit of these approaches is therefore that, on one hand, if a 
country is officially a floater or IT, the choice of the bilateral  exchange rate to take into 
account is, to some extent, arbitrary; on the other hand, the results may be misleading if the 
real regime is in fact a (strict or flexible) basket peg.
A different approach has been set up by Frankel and Wei (1994) to estimate the weights in a 
currency basket: when a country adopts a basket peg, it seldom announces which currencies 
are  included in the basket and their  weights.  If  we regress the change in  the value of a 
currency  (expressed  as  its  SDR  exchange  rate14)  on  the  change  in  the  value  of  some 
international reserve currencies, we can derive the weights in the basket. In case of a strict 
peg, OLS is especially appropriate since the model is linear and yields an almost perfect fit. 
However, it is less on firm grounds and potentially not correctly specified if the basket peg 
allows for some flexibility (for example, it has a band or moving band). Therefore, it could 
not be used to disentangle Fear of Floating episodes. In order to merge the techniques to infer 
exchange rate  flexibility and those to  estimate  the weights  in  a currency basket,  Frankel 
[2008] and Frankel and Wei [2008] (henceforth FW) extended their original approach. They 
run the following regression to estimate both the weights in a currency basket and the degree 
of exchange rate flexibility:
  e t=c∑
i=1
N
i X i emptu t (19)
where e is the (log) value of a currency (number of units of domestic currency per SDR); X is 
the value of the N currencies that form the (potential) basket, and  Δemp is the percentage 
change in the “exchange market pressure index” where the latter is defined as:
  empt=e tF t (20)
and Res is the (log) value of Foreign Exchange Reserves, appropriately corrected in order to 
take valuation changes and interest rate earnings into account.
The ω coefficients capture the de facto weights on the constituent currencies (after we restrict 
their sum to 1), and the market pressure index is defined so that we should have δ = 0 when 
there is a strict peg, δ = 1 in the case of a pure float. However, as it is acknowledged by the 
authors, this correspondence would be perfect if countries used foreign exchange reserves 
14 See Frankel and Wei [2008] for a discussion on the choice of the SDR as definition of 'value of a currency'.
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only to intervene on the exchange market and therefore the stock of reserves did not change 
otherwise. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and therefore countries will all lie in the [0,1] 
interval with the more committed floaters showing a higher coefficient. Countries with  a 
higher degree of flexibility will also show lower R2.
A  caveat  regarding  the  main  limit  of  regime  classification  literature  is  necessary.  These 
approaches  are  not  structural  analyses  of  the  determinants  of  exchange  rate  movements; 
rather, they detect empirical regularities that allow one to distinguish between “pure floaters” 
and  different  levels  of  exchange  rate  management  or  pegging,  regardless  of  how  the 
exchange arrangement is officially classified. From this point of view, if we have two groups 
of  “benchmark  floaters”  and  “benchmark  peggers”  we  can  use  the  above  classification 
schemes to infer to which group a specific country is closer.
4. The Data 
This work applies the regime classification schemes outlined in the previous section in order 
to observe the evolution of European monetary integration and to show the extent to which 
such classification schemes provide consistent results. The dataset is monthly and composed 
of  23  countries  and  53  exchange  rate  regimes  over  1980:01  –  2009:03.  It  includes  18 
European countries and 5 non-European “benchmark floaters”.  The former group is quite 
heterogeneous as far as official monetary policy and attitude towards the EMU and EU: three 
countries are not EU members (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland), four are EU members that 
have  recently  adopted  the  euro  (Malta,  Cyprus,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia),  three  are  ERM 
members (Latvia, Lithuania and Denmark, and the latter has opted out of EMU), two have a 
currency board15 (Estonia  and Bulgaria)  and the remaining  six  are  EU members  that  are 
Inflation  Targeters  (Sweden,  United  Kingdom,  Czech  Republic,  Poland,   Hungary, 
Romania); out of these, the UK has opted out of EMU.  
The  set  of  “benchmark  floaters”  is  made  up  of  New Zealand,  Australia,  United  States, 
Canada and Japan. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are Inflation Targeters. 
More specifically, the procedure will be applied over the whole 1980-2008 period, dividing 
the latter in three subperiods: the ERM era (from 1980 to october 1992), the post-ERM era 
(november 1992 to 1998), and the Euro era (1999 to present). Data come from IFS of the 
International Monetary Fund and national Central Banks.
Actual reference subperiods for the single countries may be different from the above, in order 
to avoid mixing data with different exchange rate regimes.
15 Lithuania, which is listed among the ERM II members, also have a currency board arrangement with the euro.
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As  far  as  Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEEC)  countries  are  concerned,  due  to  data 
availability  the  analysis  is  performed  only  from 1993 on,  and  the  exact  starting  year  is 
different from country to country.
On the above data I apply the CR and FW approaches. The bilateral exchange rate taken into 
consideration  for  the CR approach is  against  the  euro  (German  Mark)  for  the  European 
countries  and the  United  States  since  (until)  1999,  and  the  US dollar  for  non-European 
countries,  as  in CR16.  During the ERM era,  the parities  were defined with respect  to the 
European Currency Unit (ECU); however, it was the Bundesbank which had the leading role 
in the system, and the Mark was the main reserve currency in the region and also had the 
largest weight in the ECU basket. 
5. The Calvo-Reinhart Approach
As discussed in Section 3, in an exchange rate arrangement different from a free float, the 
volatility of the exchange rate should be low. As pointed out by prior (13), the probability 
that the monthly percentage change in the exchange rate is lower, in absolute terms, than 
some threshold x should be higher when there is some form of limited flexibility with respect 
to a pure float. Such probability is estimated here using 2-year rolling windows.
In this Section the empirical distribution of the monthly percentage change in the bilateral 
exchange rate, Δe, is observed, with two thresholds: 1%, as in CR and Ball and Reyes [2008] 
and 2.25%, as in the ERM. The 1% threshold is also used by Reinhart and Rogoff to identify 
de  facto  pegs  or  crawling  pegs.   Tables  3-5  present  the  results  of  the  Calvo-Reinhart 
approach  on  exchange  rate  volatility  over  the  three  subperiods  introduced  in  section  4; 
tables6-8 concentrate  on foreign exchange reserves volatility.  Table  3 shows the relevant 
figures for the countries in the sample during the ERM era; for each of them, the time period 
considered is also indicated. Since the objective is to highlight the differences in exchange 
rate volatility due to different exchange rate arrangements, the criterion for the choice of the 
time  span is  membership  of  the  ERM for  the  European  countries,  and  the  date  when a 
floating regime was adopted for the benchmark floaters. Norway was not a member of the 
ERM over the period, it had a basket peg instead. The Norwegian Krone was pegged to the 
ECU in 1990, and the peg was abandoned in december 1992 following the turbulence of the 
previous months.
16 Actually, CR use only the bilateral exchange rate against the DM for European countries because their dataset 
is entirely pre-euro, while BR use first the DM and then the euro.
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Table 3. Exchange Rate Volatility during the ERM years
De jure 
regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly % change in 
nominal exchange rate falls within
± 1% band ± 2.25% band
Floaters
Australia17 Jan 1984 – Dec 1992 32.4% 67.3%
Japan Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 30.5% 59.3%
New Zealand18 Mar 1985 – Dec 1989 35.9% 70.7%
United States Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 18.4% 53.5%
Canada Jan 1980 – Dec 1990 79.6% 98.9%
Limited 
Flexibility
Sweden19 Jun 1985 – Oct 1992 74.2% 99.4%
United Kingdom20 Oct 1990 – Sep 1992 58.3% 95.8%
Norway Jan 1980 – Dec 1992 56.5% 90.1%
Denmark Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 93.4% 98.6%
Switzerland 21 Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 64.3% 94.2%
The results in Table 3 confirm prior (14); countries with a floating regime systematically 
exhibit higher bilateral exchange rate volatility, except for Canada, with respect to countries 
that adopted a managed float. Later in this section, tests on the difference of the means are 
performed in order to test whether such difference is statistically significant.
Table 4 summarizes the results for the 1992:11-1998:12 period. After the crisis in the autumn 
1992,  Sweden,  Norway  and  the  United  Kingdom  abandoned  the  limited  flexibility 
arrangement. While Sweden and the UK never went back to limited flexibility, and rather 
moved to Inflation Targeting,  Norway left its currency free to float  only until the end of 
1994, and a managed float versus a basket of currencies was adopted from january 1995. 
Again, the prediction of prior (14) is fulfilled, although a test on the means will be needed to 
state  the  significance  of  the  differences.  Countries  that  were  listed  as  in  a  pure  float  or 
Inflation Targeting exhibit a higher volatility of the nominal exchange rate. 
We now turn to the exchange rates developments after the introduction of the euro. 
17 Australia adopted a floating exchange rate in December 1983, therefore it can be included in the group of 
benchmark floaters only from 1984 on.
18 New Zealand adopted a floating exchange rate regime in february 1985.
19 Sweden joined the ERM in june 1985; as a term of comparison during the period 1980:1 – 1985:6, the figures  
were 60% and 90.8% respectively.
20 As previously said, the United Kingdom was member of the ERM only in the period 1990:10-1992:9; during 
1980:1-1989:12, the figures were 40.8% and 73.3% respectively.
21 Switzerland was not  a  member of  ERM. However,  empirical  work has proved that,  in the period under 
consideration, the Swiss National Bank did stabilize the CHF/DM and the CHF/FF exchange rate (see Von 
Ungern-Sternberg, 1987).
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Table 4. Exchange Rate Volatility after the collapse of ERM
De jure 
Regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly 
percent change in nominal 
exchange rate falls within
Official
Anchor 
Currency
± 1% band ± 2.25% band
Floaters
Japan Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 32.9% 62.7%
United States Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 38.5% 72.0%
Inflation 
Targeters
Canada Jan 1991 – Dec 1998 69.8% 96.1%
Australia Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 39.5% 78.9%
New Zealand Jan 1990 – Dec 1998 48.6% 81.1%
Sweden Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 40.5% 78.4%
Un. Kingdom Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 43.2% 83.8%
Managed 
Floating 
and 
Limited 
Flexibility
Norway Nov 1992 – Feb 2001 77.4% 97.3% Basket
Denmark Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 90.5% 98.6% DM
Switzerland Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 64.9% 98.6% DM
Bulgaria Jan 1997 – Dec 1998 75.0% 75.0% DM
Czech Rep. Jan 1993 – May 1997 65.8% 97.3% DM
Hungary Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 45.8% 78.7% DM
Latvia Feb 1994 – Dec 2004 96.5% 100.0% SDR
Lithuania Apr 1994 – Dec 2000 96.1% 96.1% USD
Poland Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 47.0% 84.2% DM, USD
Slovak Rep. Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 53.8% 88.5% DM
Peg Estonia Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 100.0% 100.0% DM
The story shown in Table 5 is quite puzzling. The figures for Pegs, Managed Floatings and 
Limited  Flexibility  arrangement  are  quite  similar  to  each  other,  as  expected.  As  far  as 
inflation targeters are concerned, we notice that during the ten years after the introduction of 
the  euro,  bilateral  exchange  rates  vis  à  vis  the  euro have  exhibited  remarkable  stability. 
European Inflation Targeters, except for Poland and Romania, present figures that are closer 
to  those  of  peggers  than  to  other  IT  countries.  This  is  true  in  particular  for  Sweden, 
Switzerland and the Czech Republic. The case of Norway is interesting: after the basket peg 
(de facto, a strict peg to the Euro) was abandoned in march 2001, the euro exchange rate of 
the kroner became more volatile, but still remained within the range of what Reinhart and 
Rogoff would classify as a “de facto narrow band”. While this is not enough to state that the 
countries under consideration have adopted some sort of exchange rate management,  and 
further analyses are necessary, still the volatility is much lower than for the group of floaters.
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Table 5. Exchange Rate Volatility after the introduction of the Euro
De jure 
regime Country Period
Probability that the % change in 
nominal exchange rate is within
Official 
Anchor 
Currency± 1% band ± 2.25% band
Floaters
Japan Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 35.0% 66.2%
United States Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 29.6% 66.6%
Inflation 
Targeters
Australia Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 27.5% 61.8%
New Zealand Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 27.2% 61.4%
Canada Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 37.8% 82.1%
Sweden Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 68.0% 97.3%
Un. Kingdom Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 56.6% 88.2%
Norway Mar 2001 – Mar 2009 51.5% 84.2%
Switzerland Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 80.5% 98.4%
Czech Rep. Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 59.0% 94.8%
Poland Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 35.8% 66.4%
Hungary Aug 2001 – Mar 2009 54.0% 87.0%
Romania Jan 2005 – Mar 2009 44.5% 74.9%
Iceland Jan 2001 – Mar 2009 38.6% 69.4%
Peg
Bulgaria Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 91.3% 91.3% Euro
Estonia Jan 1999 - Mar 2009 100.0% 100.0% Euro
Managed 
Floating
Malta Jan 1999 – Jan 2005 71.4% 97.9% Euro
Romania Jan 1999 – Dec 2004 32.2% 66.6% Euro
Slovak Rep. Jan 1999 – Nov 2005 66.5% 91.0% Euro
Hungary Jan 1999 – Jul 2001 87.0% 96.9% Euro
Norway Jan 1999 – Feb 2001 71.9% 99.0% Basket
Limited 
Flexibility
Lithuania Feb 2002 – Mar 2009 100.0% 100.0%
Euro (ERM 
II members)
Latvia Jan 2005 – Mar 2009 96.4% 100.0%
Denmark Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 100.0% 100.0%
Malta Feb 2005 – Dec 2007 100.0% 100.0%
Slovak Rep. Nov 2005 – Dec 2008 39.6% 83.3%
We now move to the analysis of foreign exchange reserves volatility, that is prior (15) above. 
Interpreting the path of foreign exchange interventions is, however, less easy. In theory, in a 
pure float the change in foreign exchange reserves should be zero. However, this is not the 
case in reality.  First  of all,  foreign exchange reserves vary due to valuation changes and 
interest earnings. Second, they are not only used for exchange rate stabilization purposes, as 
pointed out also by CR. This is true, in particular, for New Zealand, which in our case is 
especially  interesting  since it  moved from managed float  to a  free float  in 1985,  and to 
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Inflation  Targeting  in  1990.  In  the  case  of  New Zealand,  reserves  fluctuate  due  to  the 
Treasury’s management of its overseas currency debt rather than foreign exchange market 
intervention22. 
Third,  in  order  to  manage  the  exchange  rate,  countries  also  engage  in  hidden  foreign 
exchange transactions: credit lines were widely used by ERM countries during speculative 
attacks.  Finally,  countries  may rely a lot  on interest  rate  interventions as it  was the case 
during the ERM crisis in 1992 or in the managed float of Norway which started in 1995. 
Nevertheless, the path of foreign exchange reserves can be a good indicator, although not the 
only  one,  of  the  actual  exchange  rate  policy  that  is  being  pursued  and  is  taken  into 
consideration in most of the exchange rate regime classification literature.
Tables 6-8 show the results of prior (15) in our dataset, divided by country and over the three 
subperiods introduced above. In this case, the prediction of prior (15) is not sistematically 
fulfilled: during the first period (see Table 6) there is no clear difference between reserves 
volatility in floating countries and in ERM countries.
In the second and third period, however, reserves volatility is systematically lower in the 
“benchmark floater” countries, Japan and the US, as well as Canada, while it is still higher 
for New Zealand and Australia. Besides, for countries that went through a regime switch and 
moved toward higher flexibility, reserve volatility has indeed fallen, although it remained at a 
level higher than benchmark floaters, and more precise statistical analysis would be needed.
On average, however, prior (15) holds: official floaters have the most stable foreign reserves 
(i.e. the highest probabilities), IT countries have a quite higher reserves volatility, then come 
limited flexibility, pegs and managed floating arrangements.
So far, we have found several empirical regularities that can be summarized as follows: 1. 
during the ERM era, volatility of exchange rates in Europe was lower than that exhibited by 
countries listed as “benchmark floaters”, as we expected a priori; 2. after the collapse of the 
ERM, while Denmark remained in a limited flexibility arrangement,  joining ERM II, the 
other western European countries moved, with different timing, to Inflation Targeting, while 
the CEEC went through a period of exchange rate instability, which appears in our approach 
as  massive  foreign  exchange  reserves  intervention  that  was,  however,  not  successful  in 
keeping the exchange rate stable, as it is shown in tables 2 and 5 above. 3. Starting 1999, a 
growing number of European countries moved to Inflation Targeting, while we see, in tables 
5 and 8, a remarkable stabilization of euro exchange rates and a relative increase in reserves 
volatility with respect to benchmark floaters. The United Kingdom and, in particular, Sweden 
22 See also Calvo, Reinhart [2002] p. 388. 
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and Switzerland present values on exchange rate volatility that are closer to those of a  de 
facto pegger as Denmark than to other IT countries. Similar conclusions can be drawn by 
looking at the variability of foreign exchange reserves, when the benchmark country is Japan 
or the United States. When the benchmark is Australia or New Zealand, however, data on 
foreign exchange reserves volatility do not seem informative. However, we notice that, in 
most of the cases, adoption of inflation targeting was associated with a fall in both exchange 
rate and reserves volatility. 
Figure 1 shows the results of this approach, by exchange rate regime, within our dataset. In 
theory pegs, MF and LF should be lying up and to the left, while floats and IT should be 
down and to the right. IT shows up as being an intermediate regime as far as exchange rate 
and reserves variability are concerned. 
In order to see whether such empirical  regularities are also statistically significant I then 
move to hypothesis testing. Table 9 shows the results of the tests that were run: first of all, as 
far as exchange rates variability is concerned,  t-tests on the equality of means of the prior 
(14) are presented. Second, for foreign exchange reserves, F tests on the equality of variances 
are presented.  I ran F-tests instead of tests on prior (15) because in the case of reserves, 
unlike exchange rates, the variance is a good measure of variability since it is less affected by 
periodic devaluations23.  
We start from  the tests on the mean value of the probability that the exchange rate change is 
lower than 2.25% in absolute  value.  As I stated above,  our prior expectation is that  this 
probability is highest for limited flexibility regimes and managed floating, lowest for free 
floaters, with inflation targeters in the middle. 
Table 9 shows the results divided by subperiod. We compare the probabilities of prior (14) 
for each European country to those of the non-european benchmark floaters, and then group 
the results according to the official regime. This is interesting because it allows us to see 
whether european IT regimes are similar, from the point of view of exchange rate volatility, 
to non-european floating and IT regimes.
First of all, as we expected, MF and LF regimes are significantly different from free floats 
(USA  and  Japan),  as  far  as  exchange  rate  variability  is  concerned.  Moreover,  they  are 
significantly different from the benchmark IT regimes, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
although the figures are less clear cut than in the previous case. This proves that IT regimes 
are characterized by a lower exchange rate variability than free floats, and counting them as 
benchmark floaters might be misleading, as Ball and Reyes [2008] point out.
23 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002), p. 400.
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Table 6. Foreign Exchange Reserves Volatility during the ERM years
De jure 
regime
Country Period Probability that the monthly percentage change 
in foreign exchange reserves is ≤ ± 2.5% 
Floaters
Australia Jan 1984 – Dec 1992 39.9%
Japan Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 78.2%
New Zealand Mar 1985 – Dec 1989 19.8%
Canada Jan 1980 – Dec 1991 16.4%
United States Jan 1980 – Oct 1992 33.3%
Limited 
Flexibility
Sweden Jun 1985 – Oct 1992 35.1%
United Kingdom Jan 1990 – Sep 1992 70.8%
Norway Jan 1980 – Dec 1992 31.9%
Denmark Jan 1980 – Dec 1992 27.3%
Switzerland Jan 1980 – Dec 1992 31.8%
Table 7. Foreign Exchange Reserves Volatility after the collapse of ERM
De jure 
regime
Country Period Probability that the monthly percentage change 
in foreign exchange reserves ≤ ± 2.5% 
Floaters United States Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 66.5%
Japan Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 79.7%
Switzerland Nov 92 – Dec 1998 37.8%
Inflation 
Targeters
Australia Jan 1993 – Dec 1998 57.9%
New Zealand Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 32.5%
Canada Nov 1992 – Dec 1998 34.0%
Sweden Nov 92 – Dec 1998 32.4%
United Kingdom Nov 92 – Dec 1998 71.6%
Managed 
Floaters 
and 
Limited 
Flexibility
Norway Nov 92 – Feb 2001 40.6%
Denmark Nov 92 – Dec 1998 37.8%
Latvia Jan 93 – Dec 2004 46.3%
Hungary Jan 93 – Dec 1998 28.2%
Lithuania Jan 93 – Jan 2002 28.8%
Czech Rep. Jan 93 – Dec 1998 29.4%
Slovak Rep. Jan 93 – Dec 1998 39.4%
Poland Jan 93 – Dec 1998 59.3%
Bulgaria/1 Jan 94 – Dec 1996 17.3%
Bulgaria/2 Jan 1997 – Dec 1998 29.2%
Peg Estonia Jan 93 – Dec 1998 37.8%
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Table 8. Foreign Exchange Reserves Volatility after the introduction of the Euro
De jure 
regime Country Period
Probability that the monthly percentage 
change in foreign exchange reserves is within 
± 2.5% range
Floaters
United States Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 74.9%
Japan Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 87.1%
Inflation 
Targeters
New Zealand Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 22.9%
Canada Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 71.3%
Australia Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 30.4%
Sweden Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 45.8%
United Kingdom Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 42.3%
Norway Mar 2001 – Mar 2009 47.0%
Romania Jan 2005 – Mar 2009 65.5%
Switzerland Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 68.0%
Czech Rep. Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 74.7%
Poland Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 56.1%
Iceland Apr 2001 – Mar 2009 43.6%
Hungary Jan 1999 – Mar  2009 54.5%
Managed 
Floaters
Iceland Jan 1999 – Mar 2001 37.5%
Slovakia Jan 1999 – Oct 2005 43.2%
Romania Jan 1999 – Dec 2004 39.7%
Malta Jan 1999 – Dec 2004 56.7%
Limited 
Flexibility,
Peg
Latvia Jan 2005 – Mar 2009 45.8%
Lithuania Feb 02 – Mar 2009 38.3%
Malta Jan 2005 – Dec 2007 68.5%
Slovakia Nov 05 – Dec 2008 72.0%
Denmark Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 47.7%
Estonia Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 34.8%
Bulgaria Jan 1999 – Mar 2009 34.4%
European IT regimes present a significantly lower exchange rate variability than benchmark 
floaters, and, interestingly, in most of the cases (23 out of 27) exchange rate variability is 
significantly  lower than  that  of  the  benchmark  IT countries.  The  only European IT that 
presented  exchange  rate  variability  during  the  last  10 years  comparable  with  that  of  the 
benchmark are Poland, Romania and Iceland. 
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Table 9. T-tests. Proportion of cases where P(ε< |2.25%|) is higher than the benchmark
1980-1992 1993-1998 1999-2009
Official 
Regime
Official Regime of the 
European country
Official Regime of the 
European country
Benchmark MF/LF MF/LF IT MF/LF IT
USA 100.0% 90.0% 100.0% 85.7% 66.7%
Japan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7%
Australia 77.8% 0.0% 100.0% 77.8%
New Zealand 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Canada 40.0% 0.0% 80.0% 77.8%
No. of cases 4 10 2 10 9
 
As I already stated, all of European Inflation Targeters have moved from a limited flexibility 
regime to IT during the period under analysis; in the third period, while in 28 out of 30 cases 
MF/LF regimes are significantly different from benchmark inflation targeters, the figures for 
European IT after they left the LF/MF regimes have not changed significantly, or exchange 
rates became even more stable, with the exception of Iceland and Norway, and the UK and 
Sweden only for the 1993-1998 period.
The  conclusions  of  the  previous  section  are  therefore  confirmed:  European  currencies, 
regardless of the monetary policy regime, exhibited lower exchange rate volatility than non-
European currencies; the Euro era, which was characterized by a move towards greater de 
jure flexibility24 actually shows a stabilization of exchange rates.
The increased stability of exchange rates might be the result of more synchronized business 
cycles, rather than active exchange rate policy. In order to get some insight on this point, I 
conducted F tests of the null hypothesis of the equality of variances of the monthly absolute 
percentage change in foreign exchange reserves. The tests were run for each single country 
and (official) exchange rate arrangement with the above specified subperiods. Therefore, in 
each test,  the null  hypothesis  is  that  the variance for a non-benchmark floater  (European 
countries), σ2EU, is equal to that of the non-European floating or IT country, σ2F, while the 
alternative  hypothesis  is  that  the  European  country  is  not  a  committed  floater/inflation 
targeter, and therefore σ2EU > σ2F.
When the benchmark  is  the  US or  Japan,  which are  free floaters,  the null  hypothesis  is 
rejected for all European countries and subperiods, with the exception of UK, where the null 
of  equal  variances  is  rejected  only  for  the  1999-2008  period  and  not  during  ERM 
membership, and this result is contrary to our a priori expectation. 
24 Seven Countries abandoned regimes of managed floating to adopt Inflation Targeting, while none which was 
previously float / IT moved to managed float or entered the EMU.
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Therefore, regardless of the official monetary policy strategy, European countries intervene 
on foreign exchange markets more than committed floaters.
We consider Canada as a benchmark only from 1991 on, since in that year Canada adopted 
Inflation Targeting. During 1992-1998, the null of equal variances cannot be rejected for 12 
out  of  16  cases:  only  Bulgaria,  Slovakia  and  Romania  exhibited  a  significantly  higher 
variability of reserves. During the Euro era the situation is reversed: while most European 
countries  in  the  sample  moved  to  more  flexible  regimes,  the  null  of  equal  variances  is 
rejected   in 15 cases out of 16; it is marginally accepted for the Czech Republic (which is 
Inflation Targeter as Canada); foreign exchange intervention in other countries appears to 
have been significantly larger.
When the benchmark is Australia or New Zealand, the tests on equal variances do not offer a 
clear  distinction  between  IT  regimes  and  managed  floating/limited  flexibility:  for  New 
Zealand, the null of equal variances cannot be rejected in 11 out of 16 cases in 1992-1998 
and in 13 out of 16 cases in 1999-2009; for Australia, the null cannot be rejected in 6 out of 
16 and 14 out of 16 cases. 
The tests therefore confirm that the variability of exchange rates and reserves of committed 
floaters is significantly different from that of European countries and inflation targeters in 
general, and in most of the cases this result is confirmed over all subperiods. This result is 
stronger for the period after the adoption of the euro. With the exception of Canada, which – 
from this simple perspective - seems to be the most committed inflation targeter, at least from 
the point of view of reserves variability, IT regimes do not appear significantly different from 
managed floats while they intervene significantly more than floaters. When reserves do not 
vary for other reasons, as it is the case for New Zealand (see above), this might be a proof of 
active foreign exchange intervention that can result from Fear of Floating.
6. The Frankel and Wei Approach
One of the limits of the CR approach is that the choice of the currency vis à vis which the 
bilateral exchange rate is calculated in order to assess episodes of Fear of Floating is, in some 
sense,  arbitrary.  Besides,  these  approaches  do not  fit  well  situations  where a  basket  peg 
(official or in disguise) is in place. I therefore present the results obtained using a different 
approach developed by Frankel and Wei [2008] and outlined in Section 3 above, over the 
three subperiods I have defined.
As it was stated in section 3, the FW approach consists of the OLS regression:
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e t=c∑
i=1
N
i X i emptu t
where the variables have been defined above. In order to reduce as much as possible the 
problem of parameter instability,  the exact dates sample for the regressions changes from 
country to country, to take into account regime shifts, as declared by the central banks, and to 
exclude periods of “freely falling” exchange rates as detected by Reinhart and Rogoff [2004]. 
The expression for emp is given in (20); as noted by FW, however, the percentage change in 
reserves might not be a good indicator of central bank intervention when a country holds a 
relatively low level of reserves, since a change that is small in absolute terms may show up 
like a large intervention in percentage terms: therefore, when needed, I will also estimate 
equation (19) with emp defined as25:
emp=
Rest−Res t−1
MBt−1
(21)
The vector X of foreign currencies includes the U.S. Dollar,  the Japanese Yen, the U.K. 
Pound, the German Mark and the French Franc (until 1998), the euro and, in some cases, the 
Russian Ruble. Since several countries in the dataset until 1998 actually had exchange rate 
arrangements  using  the  ECU  as  reference  basket  instead  of  single  currencies,  I  also 
performed the regression with the ECU/SDR exchange rate in place of FFR and DEM. 
In order to constrain the sum of the weights ωi to 1, I rewrite equation (18) as:
e t−UKP t=c∑
i=1
N
i X i−UKP t emptut 26 (22)
and the weight of the UK Pound can be recovered subtracting the sum of the weights on 
other countries from 1.
Table 10 and Table 11 present the results when emp is defined respectively as (20) or (21) 
above.  The  ECU (XEU) appears  in  place  of  FFR or  DEM when  the  former  regression 
presented better results in terms of model specification, R2 and precision of the coefficients. 
Table 8 shows the results when  emp is defined as in (20). It is interesting to see that no 
country, even the committed floaters, gets a coefficient for EMP close to 1: the currencies 
that  are indicated as most  freely floating only get  as high as 0.2-0.6.  This  is  due to  the 
problem  that  we  already  cited  related  to  uses  of  reserves  different  from  exchange  rate 
management.  We notice,  however,  a  positive  trend  in  δ  for  the  US,  Japan and Canada. 
Benchmark floaters, in general, have a δ coefficient that is statistically different from zero, 
except from Australia in 1984-1992 and New Zealand in 1986-1998. Australia, New Zealand 
25 See Frankel and Wei [2008], p. 396.
26 In the case of the U.K., I used the Swiss Franc to constrain the sum to 1.
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and Canada seem to have also intervened on the USD exchange rate.  However,  they are 
among the countries for which measuring the change in reserves in percentage terms might 
not be appropriate. 
In Europe, all ERM countries in the first subperiod did put a 100% weight on the ECU, 
except for Sweden and Norway, which seemed to intervene also on the USD exchange rate.
Switzerland as well shows a strict peg to the ECU. In the case of Iceland, which officially 
had a basket peg, the table shows an increase in the weight of the ECU that occurred during 
the period.  But while Denmark is a member of ERM and officially pursuing a policy of 
exchange rate targeting, and Slovakia was member of ERM during the last 2 years of the 
sample,  the same cannot  be said for Switzerland and the Czech Republic.  In the second 
subperiod, the sample also includes some CEEC. The U.K. shows a clear move toward a 
more  flexible  regime,  confirming  the  results  of  Section  5,  while  also  Switzerland  has  a 
positive and significant – though small – emp coefficient.
The official basket peg of Norway was actually a peg to the DEM with some weight also 
attached to the dollar. Most of CEEC countries officially had managed floating regimes with 
the DEM as a reference currency. Table 10.b actually shows that a large weight was also put 
on the Dollar (between .3 and .5). The exceptions were the Latvian Lats, which was pegged 
to the SDR, the Lithuanian Litas, which was pegged to the USD and the Estonian Kroon with 
a currency board to DEM. In these cases, our results are in accordance with the official 
policy.
We now move to the results of the approach during the 1999-2009 period, presented in panel 
c of Table 10. Except for Denmark, strictly pegged to the euro, Western European countries 
all have positive and significant coefficients on emp. Except for Norway after 2001 (when it 
adopted  Inflation  Targeting)  these  coefficients  are  quite  low,  always  below  0.15;  the 
coefficient  on  the  euro  is  always  positive  and  significant  at  all  levels,  which  might  be 
suggestive of central bank intervention to stabilize the euro exchange rate. In the case of the 
U.K., the central bank seems to have been managing the exchange rate with the dollar as well 
as the euro. Looking at the CEEC countries instead, the policy change in Lithuania (since 
2002) and Latvia (since 2005) when they pegged to the euro is clear in table 10.c, as well as 
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia, especially during the period of preparation to EMU, 
and Bulgaria and Estonia, which have a currency board.
As far as the eastern European inflation targeters  are concerned,  instead,  Poland and the 
Czech Republic have positive and significant coefficients for emp while the weight attached 
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to the euro has been large as well. Romania and Hungary do not seem to have moved do 
greater flexibility after the adoption of inflation targeting: δ is not significant and the weight 
on the euro has actually increased.
Table 11 presents  the results  when  emp is  defined as in (21).  The results  in  general  are 
consistent with the previous discussion. We notice however that δ is larger for New Zealand 
and Canada (for the latter, in the last subperiod it is not significantly different from 1), and it 
is now significant for Romania and Hungary after the adoption of Inflation Targeting, while 
it is marginally significant for Sweden (at 10%) and Switzerland (at 5%). 
The approach when the change in reserves is scaled by the monetary base also yields better 
results in terms of R2, while in general the equations are all correctly specified.27
Summing up, we found that: (1) benchmark floaters tend to have the largest δ coefficients in 
each subperiod; (2) in the case of peggers, the de facto policies were generally consistent 
with the official labels; (3) as far as the inflation targeters are concerned, the results of the 
Calvo-Reinhart approach are mostly confirmed: while moving to a greater flexibility since 
the beginning of the 1990s, European countries seem to have been intervening actively to 
manage the euro exchange rate.  
Frankel  and  Wei  also  adapt  their  model  in  order  to  look  for  particular  “trends”  in  the 
composition of the baskets. For example, in the case of China, they verify whether the weight 
on the dollar actually decreased after the move to a basket peg in 2005 by augmenting the 
regression, including t*X  for all explanatory variables.
To check for possible trends in the weight of the euro in the policies of European countries, I 
instead ran the same regression over 5-year rolling windows. This approach is preferable for 
a number of reasons: first of all, we save on degrees of freedom; second, the trend is not 
necessarily linear, and therefore using a linear trend might yield no results; third, since in 
most of the cases we do not have official regime shifts, this can allow us to detect policy 
changes at specific times.  Figure (2) shows the estimates of the  emp   coefficient and the 
weight on the euro for the European countries that are inflation targeting which, among other 
things, are also those for which we have the least clear answer. 
Sweden shows a  fairly  stable  δ  coefficient  while  there  has  been  a  clear  increase  in  the 
“weight” of the euro during the period, except for the last few windows, which are affected 
by the instability of the end of 2008; however, a recursive test of structural break shows no 
evidence of breaks. A note on the last few observations in the sample is necessary. Instability 
27 Results of specification tests are available on request.
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was common to all countries in our sample and, in general, to small open economies: as it 
was acknowledged by the Sveriges Riksbank in its Monetary Policy Report of October 23rd 
2008: “It is unclear exactly what this weakening is due to, but in times of great anxiety, small  
countries'  currencies  are  usually  regarded  as  uncertain  and  they  weaken.  The  krona 
weakened, for instance, after the crises in 1997-98 and (…) in September 2001. This is clear,  
for instance, from the krona's position against the euro (…).”. 
The U.K. seems to have moved towards greater exchange rate flexibility since 2003 while the 
weight on the euro remained fairly stable.  Norway adopted inflation targeting in 2001, but 
has been increasing exchange rate flexibility throughout the period; the weight on the euro 
also was increasing for most of the sample. 
Iceland is a peculiar case. It moved to IT in 2001, an indeed the emp coefficient is stable and 
close  to  zero  before  that,  and  then  trending  upward.  The  second  half  of  2008  was 
characterized by financial  instability,  that  ended up in a weakening of the krona and the 
collapse of the financial system, so that convertibility of the krona was also suspended. The 
figures show a gradual move towards greater flexibility (coupled with a declining weight on 
the euro) for most of the sample and a peak in the euro weight in the last few windows. 
The estimates for Switzerland present a fall in δ since 2000, while it remained fairly stable 
and significant for the rest of the period, around the value of 0.03. The weight on the euro has 
been slightly trending upwards until 2007-2008, reaching 1.0.
The Czech Republic adopted IT in 1998. Throughout the period the  δ coefficient has been 
increasing, while the weight on the euro remained stable around 1.0, which makes it, as for 
Switzerland, interpretable as an informal reference currency. The same holds for  Hungary 
from 2001 on, when it adopted IT. However, at the end of the sample,  δ has been falling, 
which might be interpreted as a sign of the central bank intervening actively to defend the 
forint due to the weakening in the second half of 2008. 
Confirming  the  results  of  the  CR approach and the  regressions,  Poland,  where  inflation 
targeting has been introduced at  the end of 199828 shows the highest   and most  stable  δ 
coefficient among its fellow eastern European partners, the weight on euro does not show a 
clear trend and is significantly lower, around .4-.5. 
Finally,  Romania adopted inflation targeting in 2005. In this case the weight on the euro is 
increasing over the whole period, reaching 0.8 in the final part, while δ is slightly increasing.
28 A crawling band actually remained in place until april 2000, but it had been widened to ±15% in march 1999, 
which made the band practically irrelevant (see also Golinelli, Rovelli [2004])
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Table 10 - Frankel Approach with EMP = Δln(Res)
a. Period 1 - 1980-1992
US Japan Australia New Zealand Canada
c 0.000 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
xeu 0.308** 0.480*** -0.217 -0.120 0.039
(0.128) (0.112) (0.199) (0.261) (0.055)
usd 0.412*** 0.818*** 0.604*** 0.921***
(0.064) (0.119) (0.185) (0.040)
jpy 0.507*** 0.031 0.084 -0.026
(0.100) (0.144) (0.224) (0.037)
emp 0.112** 0.247*** 0.084 0.036 -0.026***
(0.046) (0.073) (0.051) (0.041) (0.006)
R2 0.372 0.510 0.505 0.249 0.895
N 154 154 106 58 130
Sweden Norway Denmark Switzerland U.K. Malta Iceland
1990-1992 1983-1986 1987-1992
c -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.001** 0.011*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
xeu 0.589*** 0.586*** 1.032*** 0.949*** 1.539*** 0.439*** 0.512***
(0.090) (0.073) (0.081) (0.094) (0.371) (0.034) (0.124)
dem 1.742**
(0.864)
ffr -1.441
(0.862)
usd 0.194*** 0.155*** 0.007 -0.066 0.115 0.285*** 0.572*** 0.245***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.199) (0.042) (0.174) (0.018) (0.103) (0.059)
jpy 0.030 0.073* 0.046 0.174*** -0.063 0.065*** -0.115 0.025
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.060) (0.129) (0.019) (0.127) (0.076)
emp 0.001 0.033** 0.002 0.020 0.194 0.038 0.112 0.044
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.119) (0.026) (0.072) (0.032)
R2 0.824 0.714 0.888 0.712 0.793 0.921 0.681 0.539
N 89 152 154 154 25 154 38 74
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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b. Period 2 - 1993-1998
US Japan Australia New Zealand Canada Sweden Norway Denmark
c 0.001 -0.010 0.001 0.000 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
dem 1.043*** 0.775***
(0.416) (0.227)
ffr -0.649 0.110
(0.427) (0.246)
xeu 0.377*** -167 0.127 -0.061 0.860 1.131***
(0.097) (0.149) (0.137) (0.095) (0.166) (0.055)
usd 0.492** 0.834*** 0.758*** 1.000 0.215 0.250* -0.009
(0.192) (0.135) (0.076) (0.052) (0.133) (0.136) (0.049)
jpy 0.241*** 0.107 0.177*** -0.009 0.004 -0.081 0.058
(0.062) (0.083) (0.032) (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) (0.025)
emp 0.354*** 0.546*** 0.177*** 0.032 -0.059 0.022 -0.007 -0.009
(0.102) (0.118) (0.053) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.012)
R2 0.538 0.556 0.558 0.654 0.854 0.547 0.745 0.859
N 72 72 72 96 84 74 48 72
Czech Rep. Cyprus Malta Hungary Switzerland U.K. Iceland
1993-1997 1993-1995 1996-1998
c 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.011*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
dem 0.848*** 0.528*** 0.464*** -0.719 0.679***
(0.217) (0.166) (0.129) (0.687) (0.197)
ffr -0.076 0.205 0.071 1.077 0.343
(0.222) (0.153) (0.180) (0.684) (0.210)
xeu 0.646*** 0.812*** 0.744***
(0.077) (0.185) (0.190)
usd 0.407*** 0.111*** 0.235*** 0.269 0.489*** -0.096 0.294*** 0.203
(0.093) (0.033) (0.055) (0.282) (0.094) (0.079) (0.087) (0.125)
jpy -0.079 0.012 -0.018 -0.123 -0.046 0.104 0.033 0.021
(0.119) (0.019) (0.036) (0.269) (0.068) (0.036) (0.042) (0.050)
emp 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.565* 0.088** 0.060** 0.227*** 0.004
(0.021) (0.009) (0.017) (0.285) (0.037) (0.030) (0.059) (0.008)
R2 0.677 0.919 0.808 0.411 0.629 0.843 0.776 0.556
N 60 72 36 36 72 72 74 72
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b. Period 2 (continued)
Poland Romania Latvia Lithuania Slovak Rep. Estonia Slovenia
c -0.003 0.026*** 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
dem 0.310*** 0.005 1.175***
(0.098) (0.009) (0.150)
ffr -0.037 -0.006 -0.206
(0.098) (0.009) (0.149)
xeu 0.678*** 0.860* 0.895*** 1.164***
(0.164) (0.445) (0.148) (0.080)
usd 0.389*** 0.049 0.446*** 0.995*** 0.380*** -0.011 -0.142*
(0.134) (0.578) (0.024) (0.004) (0.099) (0.046) (0.076)
jpy 0.042 -0.166 0.168*** 1 -0.044 0.097 0.090**
(0.075) (0.141) (0.000) (0.001) (0.052) (0.175) (0.037)
emp 0.241* 0.278*** 0.010 0.000 0.023 -0.017 -0.010
(0.121) (0.081) (0.010) (0.001) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
R2 0.613 0.277 0.951 1.000 0.671 0.939 0.827
N 42 71 48 48 72 72 72
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c. Period 3 - 1999-2009
US Japan Australia New Zealand Canada Sweden
c 0.000 -0.008*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
eur 0.359*** 0.180** 0.613*** 0.580*** 0.208** 0.783***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.110) (0.131) (0.082) -85
usd 0.728*** 0.108 0.052 0.659*** -0.132
(0.091) (0.128) (0.112) (0.090) (0.091)
jpy 0.454*** -0.057 -0.037 -0.018 0.074
(0.028) (0.099) (0.085) (0.079) (0.082)
emp 0.687*** 0.633*** 0.049* 0.071** 0.377*** 0.073***
(0.141) (0.100) (0.025) (0.035) (0.072) (0.027)
R2 0.829 0.715 0.270 0.246 910 0.639
N 122 122 122 122 122 122
Czech R. Norway Denmark Switzerland Iceland U.K.
1999-2000 2001-2009
c -0.004*** -0.001 0.000 0.0000 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
eur 0.842*** 0.503*** 0.668*** 1.035*** 0.917*** 0.582* 0.650***
(0.097) (0.075) (0.068) (0.024) (0.075) (0.336) (0.220)
usd -0.030 0.305*** 0.291*** -0.016 0.028 0.425** 0.487***
(0.095) (0.102) (0.058) (0.010) (0.058) (0.207) (0.100)
jpy -0.013 0.041 -0.017 0.004 0.156*** -0.613*** 0.030
(0.051) (0.066) (0.041) (0.011) (0.054) (0.204) (0.040)
emp 0.261** 0.347*** 0.653*** 0.003 0.086** 0.083** 0.130***
(0.113) (0.062) (0.058) (0.005) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040)
R2 0.693 0.866 0.828 0.985 0.840 0.225 0.593
N 122 25 97 122 122 122 122
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c. Period 3 (continued)
Poland Romania Hungary Cyprus Malta
99-00 01-09 99-05 05-09 99-01 01/09/09 1999-2007 99-04 05-07
c -0.005 -0.003 0.014*** -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
eur 0.510*** 0.369*** 0.436** 0.801*** 0.919*** 1.215*** 0.907*** 0.545*** 0.971***
(0.163) (0.090) (0.182) (0.214) (0.094) (0.182) (0.029) (0.023) (0.050)
rur 0.299** 0.378***
(0.135) (0.076)
usd 0.203 -0.053 0.361** 0.042 0.214 -0.171* -0.005 0.174*** -0.029
(0.316) (0.102) (0.178) (0.128) (0.148) (0.095) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
jpy -0.147 -0.021 -0.008 -0.092 -0.028 -0.134 0.004 0.011 0.019
(0.136) (0.079) (0.100) (0.126) (0.115) (0.092) (0.014) (0.017) (0.027)
emp 0.475 0.529*** 0.014 0.344 0.119 0.141 -0.001 -0.015 0.001
(0.097) (0.064) (0.042) (0.105) (0.078) (0.053) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008)
R2 0.768 0.715 0.193 0.614 0.779 0.619 0.939 0.921 0.940
N 24 98 71 51 29 92 108 72 36
Latvia Lithuania Slovak Rep. Estonia Bulgaria Slovenia
1999-2005 2005-2009 1999-2002 2002-2009 1999-2005 2005-2008 1999-2006
c -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007** 0.000 -0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
eur 0.203*** 0.885*** 0.002 0.849*** 0.697*** 0.959*** 1.025*** 1.026*** 0.887***
(0.022) (0.067) (0.002) (0.069) (0.096) (0.061) (0.016) (0.035) (0.053)
rur 0.069* 0.040
(0.037) (0.036)
usd 0.383*** -0.041 1.002*** -0.045 -0.008 0.025 -0.024 -0.015 -0.019
(0.039) (0.068) (0.004) (0.052) (0.088) (0.119) (0.016) (0.017) (0.054)
jpy 0.107*** 0.122*** -0.002 0.087** 0.010 -0.016 0.001 -0.007 0.004
(0.023) (0.042) (0.002) (0.042) (0.056) (0.088) (0.004) (0.012) (0.036)
emp 0.003 -0.013 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.011 0.031
(0.008) (0.020) (0.001) (0.015) (0.016) (0.093) (0.004) (0.011) (0.026)
R2 0.915 0.896 1.000 0.879 0.500 0.720 0.939 0.952 0.816
N 71 51 37 85 81 38 122 122 84
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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Table 11. Frankel Approach with EMP = Δ Res / MB
a. Period 1 - 1980-1992
Australia New Zealand Canada U.K. Norway Switzerland
c 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
dem 0.948***
(0.120)
ffr -0.056
(0.127)
xeu -0.231 -0.100 0.284*** 1.069*** 0.443***
(0.194) (0.254) (0.063) (0.215) (0.060)
usd 0.789*** 0.599*** 0.531*** 0.110 0.263*** -0.050
(0.115) (0.187) (0.055) (0.146) (0.026) (0.044)
jpy 0.055 0.089 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.120**
(0.138) (0.230) (0.038) (0.032) (0.048)
emp 0.211*** 0.065 0.645*** 0.085 0.419*** 0.024
(0.076) (0.049) (0.086) (0.123) (0.069) (0.015)
R2 0.545 0.262 0.916 0.815 0.814 0.787
N 106 58 130 25 152 154
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.
b. Period 2 – 1993-1998
Australia New Zealand Canada U.K. Sweden Switzerland Norway Poland
c 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
dem 0.694***
(0.201)
ffr 0.343
(0.214)
xeu -0.078 0.125 0.180*** 0.652*** 0.826*** 0.999*** 0.742***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.066) (0.078) (0.168) (0.102) (0.241)
usd 0.757*** 0.752*** 0.606*** 0.323*** 0.236* -0.110 0.153 0.300
(0.120) (0.076) (0.062) (0.071) (0.133) (0.077) (0.093) (0.206)
jpy 0.122* 0.180*** 0.100*** 0.006 0.102*** -0.011 0.040
(0.069) (0.051) (0.030) (0.054) (0.036) (0.037) (0.081)
emp 0.310*** 0.092** 0.697*** 0.269*** 0.003 0.029 0.167* 0.378**
(0.079) (0.041) (0.077) (0.058) (0.017) (0.021) (0.093) (0.175)
R2 0.642 0.668 0.909 0.897 0.542 0.839 0.744 0.654
N 72 96 84 74 74 74 48 42
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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c. Period 3 – 1999-2009
Australia New Zealand Canada Sweden Norway Czech Rep.
1999-2000 2001-2009
c -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
eur 0.615*** 0.462*** 0.296*** 0.810 0.503*** 0.668*** 0.910***
(0.110) (0.117) (0.027) (0.086) (0.075) (0.058) (0.151)
usd 0.112 0.055 0.440*** -0.155 0.305*** 0.291*** -0.143
(0.128) (0.103) (0.020) (0.095) (0.102) (0.058) (0.087)
jpy -0.065 0.010 0.137*** 0.067 0.041 -0.017 -0.048
(0.100) (0.077) (0.017) (0.084) (0.066) (0.041) (0.076)
emp 0.046* 0.247*** 0.985*** 0.029* 0.347*** 0.653 0.050
(0.024) (0.079) (0.020) (0.016) (0.062) (0.058) (0.044)
R2 0.270 0.363 0.975 0.623 0.866 0.828 0.598
N 122 122 122 122 25 97 122
Hungary Poland Romania U.K. Switzerland
1999-2001 2001-2009 1999-2000 2001-2009 1999-2005 2005-2009
c -0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.014*** -0.006** -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
eur 0.932*** 1.263*** 0.510*** 0.369*** 0.436** 0.801*** 0.458*** 0.929***
(0.086) (0.200) (0.163) (0.090) (0.182) (0.214) (0.065) (0.077)
rur 0.299** 0.378***
(0.135) (0.076)
usd 0.137 -0.186* 0.203 -0.052 0.361** 0.042 0.410*** 0.011
(0.134) (0.099) (0.316) (0.102) (0.177) (0.128) (0.069) (0.057)
jpy -0.021 -0.162 -0.147 -0.021 -0.008 -0.093 0.160***
(0.118) (0.099) (0.136) (0.079) (0.100) (0.105) (0.055)
emp 0.016 0.078** 0.475*** 0.529*** 0.014 0.344*** 0.267*** 0.060**
(0.036) (0.032) (0.097) (0.064) (0.042) (0.105) (0.079) (0.029)
R2 0.757 0.590 0.768 0.491 0.193 0.615 0.775 0.834
N 29 92 24 98 71 51 122 122
*** Statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant  at 10%. 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis.
7. Conclusions
This paper discussed the issue of exchange rate flexibility in European countries than are not 
in  the EMU using two approaches  recently developed by the literature  on exchange rate 
regime classification, namely Calvo and Reinhart [2002] and Frankel and Wei [2008]. The 
starting point was the observation that official regimes, from the point of view of exchange 
rate management, are moving towards a polarization: either free floats, coupled with Inflation 
Targeting, or pegs. However, empirical works cited in this paper proved that the official label 
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of the regime is not always an accurate description of what countries do in practice. I wanted 
to  see  whether  this  is  the  case  also  in  Europe,  especially  since  the  creation  of  a  large, 
neighbouring  currency  union  might  provide,  for  this  group  of  small  open  economies,  a 
natural anchor.
The results obtained by the CR and the FW approaches in this paper are generally consistent, 
and the conclusions are quite mixed.
Fixed exchange rate arrangements have shown substantial stability across countries and, in 
particular, during the euro era. In some cases, however, when the euro is the formal anchor, 
we can see that indeed some weight on the US Dollar or the Yen is present (for example, in 
Latvia and Lithuania after they joined the ERMII). 
Inflation Targeting regimes in Europe appear to have brought about an increase in exchange 
rate  flexibility,  although  generally  not  to  a  level  comparable  to  that  of  the  benchmark 
floaters; however, some weight on euro exchange rate stabilization seems to have remained 
in place: first of all, bilateral exchange rate volatility is much lower than that which has been 
observed for benchmark floaters and for non-European IT regimes. This is true, in particular, 
for  Sweden, Switzerland and the Czech Republic. Second, European IT countries all made 
extensive use of foreign exchange reserves, more than both free floaters like the USA and 
Japan, and also more than an Inflation Targeter as Canada. Only Australia and New Zealand, 
among  our  set  of  non-European countries,  showed substantial  reserves  volatility,  but  for 
reasons different from those that would be implied by exchange rate management29. The shift 
from fixed exchange rates to IT brought about lower reserve volatility but still not to a level 
comparable with that of benchmark floaters. As it is not clear why the Central Bank of an IT 
country would make such extensive use of foreign exchange reserves, the interpretation of 
this result should be further explored. 
The FW approach in Section 6 showed that some weight on exchange rate stabilization might 
indeed  have  been  put  by  all  Inflation  Targeting  Central  Banks.  This  result  apparently 
contradicts the statement (see Svensson [2003], Taylor [2001] and Ball and Reyes[2008], for 
example)  that  Inflation  Targeting  regimes  should  not,  and  do  not,  have  exchange  rate 
objectives separate from that of inflation control. 
In order to observe the evolution of both exchange rate flexibility and the weights given to 
foreign currencies when structural breaks are not present, I also estimated the FW regressions 
for IT countries using 5-year rolling windows. As far as Europe is concerned, the results 
show both a low exchange rate flexibility index and a high weight on the euro which, in most 
29 See above (p. 18).
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of the cases, was not statistically different from unity. Towards the end of the sample, when 
the financial instability that characterized the last months of 2008 increased the pressure on 
small  currencies,  this  showed up as a drop in the “weight” of the euro and – except for 
Hungary  –  a  stable  or  even  higher  flexibility  coefficient,  showing  that  exchange  rate 
stabilization was not a primary concern of Central Banks in this context. Rather, as it appears 
from the Sveriges Riksbank's bulletin cited in section 7, they might have enjoyed the benefits 
of having a weaker currency in a period of economic crisis.
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APPENDIX A – The composition of the SDR from 1980 to 2009
The SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is an international reserve asset created by the IMF in the 
1969 that is composed as a basket of the major international currencies.  The weights are 
updated every 5 years. The following table summarizes the SDR composition during 1980-
2009.
1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-98 1999-00 2001-05 2006-10
U.S. Dollar 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.45 0.45
Euro 0.32 0.29 0.34
German Mark 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21
French Franc 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11
Japanese Yen 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.11
U.K. Pound 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Figure 1. The Calvo – Reinhart Approach
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